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Contesting the Public Sphere: Within and
against Critical Theory
david ingram
This chapter examines how European thinkers working from within and
without the Frankfurt School of critical theory have understood the public
sphere as a distinctive political category. First-generation members of the
school rejected institutional democracy and mass politics as ideologies that
mask domination. The succeeding generation, whose most important representative is Jürgen Habermas, rejected that diagnosis. Habermas’s more
optimistic assessment of the emancipatory potential of the public sphere as
a medium of rational learning sought a middle ground between critics and
defenders of liberal democracy. This ambivalence provoked strong counterreactions from systems theorists, such as Niklas Luhmann, and from adherents of theories of agonal democracy descended from Carl Schmitt, on the
right, and Hannah Arendt, on the Left. As we shall see, these reactions are
ampliﬁed by those who seek to extend the public sphere beyond the boundaries of the nation state. Because of its contested interpretation as
a descriptive and normative category, the public sphere presents us with
ambivalent possibilities for legitimating regional governing bodies, such as
the EU, as well as the global legal institutions of the United Nations.

Early Frankfurt School Dismissal of
the Public Sphere
The public sphere as we know it today was not a central category of ﬁrstgeneration critical theory except in the sense that it epitomized a symptom of
modern administered society. It was mass democracy and the propagandistic
manipulation of public opinion, after all, that gave rise to the totalitarian
political movements of the twentieth century.
Although ﬁrst-generation critical theorists recalled the bourgeois ideal of
liberal democracy as a high point of the European Enlightenment, they
believed that the economic and political conditions sustaining it had long
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https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316160879.021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

david ingram

been surpassed by the rise of industrial capitalism. In their opinion, even if the
ideal was more than an ideology, given its utopian potential for realizing
emancipatory, egalitarian, and communitarian aspirations, it clashed with the
factual description of democratic politics they inherited from Marx and
Weber and so was never taken seriously by them as a moral ideal that
could ever have real purchase in modern political life.
As intellectuals who were committed to the Marxist critique of the state,
ﬁrst-generation critical theorists believed that politics passively mirrored
economic class struggles. According to this interpretation, political interaction is ﬁercely partisan, non-consensual, and strategic. Here formal rights
constitutive of liberal democracy, such as freedom of speech and freedom of
association, appear not as universal norms serving the common interests of
humanity but as false ideologies that conceal the true nature of the state as an
instrument of bourgeois domination. Revolutionary politics thus reduces to
a power struggle for hegemonic control of the state. In Antonio Gramsci’s
view, leaders of revolutionary movements (with the aid of “organic intellectuals”) should mold their propaganda around the overlapping interests of
diverse social groups in forming an oppositional united front. Compromises
and strategic alliances between competing groups appear here as temporary
weddings of convenience, nodal points in a precarious balance of power
(modus vivendi) that serve the revolutionary struggle – hence Gramsci’s
Machiavellian disdain for moral scruples about fair play.1
The bourgeois ideal of the public sphere ﬁnds just as little purpose in the
Marxist vision of post-revolutionary communist society. For Marx, the overcoming of class domination that would accompany the advent of communism
would usher in a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” which, in turn, would
gradually terminate in the “withering away of the state” as a coercive legal
order once social conﬂicts were paciﬁed. Over time, the rational administration
of productive machinery under the democratic control of producers would
ostensibly give rise to material abundance and a reduction of the workday, so
that individuals could spend their non-laboring hours developing their aesthetic,
social, and intellectual capacities. Discussions about economic planning and
culture, however mentally stimulating, fall short of that vibrant political life
involving clashing institutional values and partisan interests.
The second factor inclining ﬁrst-generation critical theorists to dismiss the
public sphere was their reception of Max Weber’s science of organizational
1 Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings (New York: International
Publishers, 1959).
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rationality. Although Weber’s starkly pessimistic view of modern, rationalized
societies led them to reject the orthodox Marxist understanding of communist
society as a domination-free society, it also entrenched their dismissal of the
public sphere as a counter-model of enlightened freedom. Especially seminal
for their thinking was Georg Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness (1923),
which represented one of the earliest attempts to translate Marx’s theory of
“commodity fetishism” into a Weberian register. Linking the commodity form
(the exchange of equivalents) to analytic reasoning, he argued that the orthodox Marxist scientiﬁc understanding of society as a law-governed system,
which he believed correctly captured the mechanical nature of capitalism,
nonetheless concealed a more revolutionary, dialectical understanding of
society as a contradictory totality.
Weber had described modern capitalism in similar terms, as a regime that
placed on the individual not just a light cloak of easily discarded material
comfort but a hard shell (stahlhartes Gehäuse) of rationally efﬁcient consumption and production in which sub-rational impulses for moral autonomy
were crushed between the oscillating hedonism and bureaucratic discipline
dictated by the system. First-generation critical theorists expanded this diagnosis further by noting that the drive toward logical coherence and instrumental efﬁciency governing rational society inevitably leads to government
administration of a crisis-prone economic system (the thesis of state capitalism). The “totalitarian” image of a managed society wherein bureaucratic
social engineers, government insiders, and elite party cadre join forces to
manufacture popular consent around a policy of stable growth under conditions of class compromise found its most memorable depiction in the
diagnosis of the “culture industry” advanced in Adorno and Horkheimer’s
wartime classic Dialectic of Enlightenment.2 Adorno and Horkheimer not only
dissected the “identity thinking” underlying the manipulation of public
opinion from above, but also showed how mass culture generally reinforces
conformism. From their perspective, the mass-culture-mediated public
sphere was thoroughly permeated by the unspontaneous responses of preprogrammed (“scripted”) actors mechanically playing out their pre-assigned
roles.
Critical reﬂection that resists the objectifying effects of the system, they
concluded, can thus arise only by withdrawing from the public and its
political spectacles and cultivating solitary meditation on literature and
2 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (London:
Continuum, 1973).
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other “non-afﬁrmative” art forms that bespeak internal psychological conﬂicts in the face of conformist social demands. In the words of Herbert
Marcuse, true enlightenment and emancipation must begin with the “Great
Refusal”: “dropping out” of society and reconnecting with repressed erotic
instincts which aim toward utopian fulﬁllment in a domination-free reconciliation of reason and sensibility, individual and society.3 This aesthetic pathway toward enlightenment – satirized by Lukács as a “retreat to the grand
hotel Abyss” – would eventually clash with the student political movements
that were celebrated by Marcuse for their erotic counter-cultural imaginary.4
True to Marcuse’s philosophy, these movements combined political protest
with civilly disobedient carnival-like displays, thereby constituting an anarchic, plebeian counterpart to the government-manipulated, mass-mediated
bourgeois public sphere.

Habermas’s Reappraisal of the Early
Modern Public Sphere
Habermas’s reappraisal of the public sphere is typically understood from the
vantage point of his mature thought. The theory of communicative action
and the discourse theory of law and democracy inaugurated a paradigm shift
in the way critical theorists conceived reason in general and practical reason
in particular. The elevation of democratic debate rather than scientiﬁc
calculation as the essence of practical reason enabled Habermas to circumvent many of the pessimistic implications of the “dialectic of enlightenment.”
But Habermas did not develop his theory of communicative rationality – let
alone his discourse theory of the public sphere – until long after he had
resurrected a category of political life that had chieﬂy described middle-class
society in eighteenth-century Europe and North America. Today, “critical
theory” and “public sphere” have become indelibly linked in contemporary
thought thanks to the original publication of his second dissertation,
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), and its momentous
translation into English in 1989.5
Indeed, this book might be understood as foreshadowing Habermas’s later
involvement in the Sixties student movement. This is only partly true.
3 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial
Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).
4 Herbert Marcuse, Counter-revolution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).
5 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into
a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).

520

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316160879.021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Contesting the Public Sphere

Habermas’s entry into public life as well as his theoretical elaboration of the
public sphere did valorize liberal bourgeois sensibilities, but these were not
the plebeian sensibilities associated with late-eighteenth-century revolutionary mass movements that foreshadowed the rise of the proletariat and
contemporary student protest movements. That said, it is important to
bear in mind that in Habermas’s account even the plebeian public sphere,
with its “pre-literary” populist and anarchist undertones, “remain[ed]
oriented toward the intentions of the bourgeois public sphere.”6 In this
respect both plebeian and bourgeois public spheres stand opposed to another
mass political type of public sphere: the “plebiscitary-acclamatory form of
regimented public sphere characterizing dictatorships in highly developed
industrial societies.” For Habermas, then, the plebeian public sphere is an
outgrowth of the Enlightenment and its critical sensibilities, and is thus to be
distinguished from the conservative, counter-Enlightenment public sphere
associated with authoritarian rule as well as from the desiccated, depoliticized
and manipulated, public sphere associated with the modern welfare state.
The critical sensibilities of the plebeian public sphere could not have been
cultivated independently of the bourgeois public sphere, because these
sensibilities drew their nourishment from a literate and educated class composed of students, writers, and artists that had the time and the freedom to
engage in solitary reﬂection. Conversely – and contrary to the dominant
strand of Frankfurt School thinking, with the possible exception of Walter
Benjamin – Habermas insisted that such solitary literary reﬂections be linked
to a public sphere, which in the twentieth century would include massmediated venues of communication, such as television, radio, ﬁlm, and the
internet.7 In any event, by the end of the eighteenth century the bourgeois
public would begin to awaken to the cries emanating from the plebeian
public, with both complementing the other in attacking injustices associated
with class privilege.
As we shall see, Habermas’s most mature thinking about the public sphere
realigns the bourgeois public sphere and the plebeian public sphere with
different but complementary political functions within liberal democracy.
Whereas the informal public sphere of civil society gives voice to discontent
and protest, the formal public sphere institutionalized in parliamentary
6 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, xviii.
7 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in
Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (London: Fontana, 1969); and
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two. Lifeworld and
System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), 387–391.
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bodies obeys the logic of public-spirited argumentation oriented toward
reaching consensus (or compromise) for purposes of decision-making.
In between these informal and formal public spheres is the quasi-formal
public sphere constituted by mass media, which, when properly regulated,
transform expressions of discontent into reasoned opinions carrying varying
degrees of weight that government ofﬁcials should take into account when
formulating their agendas. At issue is whether this two-track division of
political communication does not reﬂect an unstable marriage between
fundamentally opposed conceptions of political action that fall short of
Habermas’s ideal of rational discourse: agonal contestation on one side
versus system-managed communication on the other.

Habermas and the Structural Transformation
of the Public Sphere
The earliest and most seminal of Habermas’s writings on the public sphere
was his second dissertation, published in 1962 under the title Strukturwandel
der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft
(The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of
Bourgeois Society). The timing of its publication was prescient, as the West
German government was engaging in draconian suppression of free speech;
in October of 1962 the ofﬁces of one of the most critical and respected news
journals, Der Spiegel, were raided by the police, and several of its editors were
arrested, imprisoned, and charged with treason for allegedly disclosing classiﬁed defense “secrets” in the journal’s critical exposé of the FRG’s defense
policies. Cold War hysteria had already forced the German Social Democratic
Party to renounce the Marxist language in its platform during its 1959
conference in Bad Godesberg. Habermas was among those professors who
ofﬁcially protested the suppression of Der Spiegel; he and his seconddissertation supervisor, Wolfgang Abendroth, helped co-found an academic
support group for the radical student wing of the Social Democratic Party,
the SDS, whose expulsion from its increasingly reactionary parent organization would eventually propel the SDS (and Habermas) into the maelstrom of
the student movement.
Structural Transformation chronicles the rise and fall of the bourgeois public
sphere in Northern Europe during the eighteenth century. It philosophically
interprets this sphere as a space encompassing face-to-face discussions in
public gatherings (such as coffee shops and town squares), informed by
a public of letters (such as newspaper and journal readership), and facilitating
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the generation and dissemination of public opinion as a critical check on
government.
The emergence of the public sphere is here portrayed as paralleling the rise
of pre-industrial capitalism and the decline of feudalism, in which state and
society, public and private, were undifferentiated. According to Habermas,
most decisive in this regard was the public appearance of “civil society.”
Paraphrasing Hannah Arendt, Habermas attributes this appearance to “[a]
private sphere that has become publicly relevant.”8 Ancient Greek society
had consigned economic concerns to the unfree, private dominion of the
household (oikos), far from the agora, the assembly, and other public venues
where political issues were openly discussed among a very small minority of
free male citizens. In the Middle Ages, economic concerns migrated out of
the household only to the extent that they came under the private dominion
of church and state. With few exceptions (such as carnivals), these institutions
monopolized public spaces for their own beneﬁt, aimed at representing their
exclusive dominion over all things public and private.9 This form of “representative publicity” gradually lost its exclusive hold with the ascendance of
city life and a burgeoning commercial trade among independent artisans and
merchants.10 Now economic life, partly emancipated from church and state,
became a matter of social concern and public discussion, much of it increasingly directed against ofﬁcial censorship and tax policy.11
The gradual expansion of a market economy composed of independent
property owners who increasingly sought to broaden their economic freedom
vis-à-vis government led to correlative demands for broader civil and political
freedom. The middle class (the Third Estate) pressured their representatives to
hold government accountable to their interests, which they came to regard as
inherently rational, and to rule by their consent. The public’s right to know
everything that affected it demanded an end to government secrecy.
In addition to challenging the legitimacy of the state, members of the middle
class organized themselves as political parties in informal gatherings which
took place in coffee houses, domestic salons, and semi-secret “table societies”
(Tischgesellschaften). By the end of the eighteenth century the presumed fairness
of a laissez-faire market economy based on contractual exchanges between free
and equals would ﬁnd its supreme philosophical defense in Immanuel Kant’s
8 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 19; and Hannah Arendt,
The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 46.
9 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 8.
10 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 18.
11 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 27.
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1784 essay “What Is Enlightenment?,” which defended the “public use of
reason” in transforming politics into morality.12 For Kant, the critical force of
rational suasion in polite conversation among intellectuals, businessmen, and
women could effect a harmonization of conﬂicting economic and political
interests in conformity with Rousseau’s moral ideal of a General Will, thereby
revealing the cosmopolitan unity of humanity necessary for universally binding
citizens to legitimate legal coercion.13 The rational overcoming of what
appeared to be an underlying contradiction between bourgeois, citoyen, and
homme, however, presumed that private property ownership and contractual
exchange between free and equals rested on a natural foundation.14
The reverse side of the bourgeois public sphere was the bourgeois private
sphere, centered on the nuclear family. Middle-class domiciles were divided
into private and public spaces; libraries and bedrooms provided room for
reading and solitary reﬂection; parlors and salons provided furnishings for
intimate discussions between friends, neighbors, and other members of the
community. The consumption of popular literature and culture generally
was seen as indispensable to forming good taste in morals, but the public’s
right to judge what it read, heard, and saw had to be informed by the
philosophical arguments of essayists. At stake were social mores, which
writers and painters often depicted as hypocritical and counter to natural
common sense. Importantly, it was the cultivation of empathy in the arts and
letters that stimulated reﬂection on ordinary life and a common humanity
that would later galvanize the political struggle for equal rights.15 Here, as in
the public sphere, the illusion of universal culture – and later, of universal
rights – was premised on masking over the contradiction that the bourgeois
nuclear family, as a space of intimate equality and humanity, presupposed
ownership of private property under the supreme authority of an independent patriarch.16
Although Habermas observes that the bourgeois public sphere was an elite
network composed mainly of men of education and/or property, it was in
principle open to all regardless of status (hence the crucial role played by
women in the salons). The equality among participants was further supported by their common economic independence (whether aristocratic or
middle class), which, in turn, encouraged trust and openness among the
12
13
14
15
16

Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 104–106.
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 54.
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 115.
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 48–51.
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 55.
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interlocutors. Rational suasion, rather than the status of the speaker, ideally
governed the outcome of discussion; and, in principle, anything that
had formerly been viewed as falling under the exclusive purview of church
and state was now open to question.17 The equality, freedom, openness, and
public-mindedness of the public sphere in turn informed the liberal and
democratic ethos of the enlightenment. But mass democracy – driven by
the emergence of industrial capitalism – coupled with the corresponding
decline of independent shop owners and small farmers, would lead to the
demise of the public sphere by the late nineteenth century.
Much of Habermas’s history of the structural transformation of the public
sphere in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries recalls familiar themes
previously adumbrated by the political theorist Hannah Arendt, concerning
the corrosive effect that socio-economic inequalities, instrumental thinking,
and the welfare state had on political action as a medium for the plural
expression of free personality, and by Adorno and other ﬁrst-generation
critical theorists, concerning the degradation of a critical literary culture in
the era of mass consumerism. The impetus for this transformation is
a dialectic pitting the implicit universality of the public sphere, which
presages the advent of mass democracy, against its foundation on private
property and commerce, whose inherent naturalness came under attack by
the other class seeking a political voice: the proletariat. This contradiction
undermined the idea of the public sphere as an arena in which rational
agreement on common interests was possible. Carl Schmitt, whose analysis
of the crisis of parliamentary democracy Habermas approvingly cites,18
portrayed this crisis as a contradiction between liberalism’s Enlightenment
faith in rational discourse and the democratic ideal of majority rule. Unlike
the former, the latter could be conﬁgured only as a Hobbesian war between
friend and foe culminating in the sovereign imposition of a single will.
To a certain extent, Schmitt was echoing Hegel’s own suspicions about the
irrationality of public opinion as an expression of civil society’s competing
interests.19 However, whereas Hegel and Schmitt looked to a strong bureaucracy and executive authority to restore rational order, Marx sought a more
populist solution. Rather than abandon the Enlightenment ideals underwriting the public sphere, he predicated their realization on the revolutionary
17 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 36.
18 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 81 and 205; and Carl Schmitt,
The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. E. Kennedy (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1988), 3–6.
19 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 122.
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abolishment of bourgeois civil society and its constitutional institutionalization of class domination, coupled with the reabsorption of a tyrannical state
bureaucracy into a now democratized proletarian civil society. John Stuart
Mill, by contrast, took the side of liberalism in his critique of majoritarian
tyranny and conformism. Defending the free and open marketplace of ideas
as the via regia toward reason and truth, he defended the importance of
educated and reasoned dissent in maintaining a politically vital public sphere.
However, because he rejected the postulate of a natural unity of interests that
still informed Marx’s vision of communist society, his faith in the epistemological virtues of the marketplace of ideas proved to be ill-founded.20
As Habermas observed, echoing Schmitt, once the social question concerning
inequality entered the expanded public sphere, the purpose of parliamentary
discussion shifted from reaching rational consensus on common interests to
negotiating compromises between differently weighted and irreconcilably
opposed interests.21 Given the importance of securing popular support in leveraging political demands, politicians came to rely on the less-compromising
rhetoric of class warfare in their popular political propaganda. After the political
debacles of the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, Europe’s efforts at seeking class
compromise ﬁnally succeeded in the form of the welfare state. Government
management of an industrial corporate economy dissolved the distinction
between state and civil society, on one side, and public and private spheres, on
the other, that had been foundational for the bourgeois public sphere.
The resulting “refeudalization” of society saw the return of the older representational form of publicity, with staged spectacles featuring political stars who
exploit the cult of personality in attracting a loyal following. Mass democracy
here amounts to passively acclaiming this or that slate of techno-political elites,22
who in turn negotiate back-room deals between the special interest groups that
elected them, in a manner reminiscent of older forms of privatized corporatist
decision-making.23 Once elected, these elites follow the dictates of their respective parties, whose administrative practices, if not campaign platforms, converge
toward the political center in managing economic growth conducive to sustaining class compromise.
Accompanying this privatization of political decision-making is an “externalization” of private domestic life.24 The mass-media invasion of the
20
21
22
23
24

Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 135.
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 178.
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 176 and 231.
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 203–204.
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 159.
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household in the form of radio and television transfers thinking from the
inward and solitary experience of reading to an outward immersion in mass
culture and advertising, where “consent” to social norms is manufactured by
government and commercial propaganda.25 Accompanying this depoliticization of consumers and clients, we ﬁnd the intelligentsia receding into their
ivory towers, taking with them their specialized focus on serious culture and
leaving the masses bereft of public reason.26

Habermas’s Transition to His Mature
Theory of the Public Sphere
By 1973 these sentiments would ﬁnd but a distant echo in Habermas’s work.
Reversing course in the wake of the turbulent sixties, Habermas argued that
a re-politicized public of students, political activists, and denizens of countercultural venues had provoked a legitimation crisis.27 Aside from changing
events, what led to Habermas’s more optimistic appraisal of the critical
potential of mass democracy was a change in his thinking about the public
sphere. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere could not have
envisaged even the conceptual possibility for a reinvigorated politics because
in theory it provided no way for the modern welfare state to recover the
ideals that had formerly underwritten the bourgeois public sphere.
Habermas’s concluding recommendation in that earlier book – that political
parties and special interest groups adopt more transparent, inclusive, and
rationally accountable forms of communication – only democratized organizational decision-making and did not address the intransigency of inter-group
conﬂict that had proven so fatal to a moral form of politics.28 His hope that
future development of the welfare state might transform conﬂict into consensus recalled a familiar theme among socialists.29 Three decades later
Habermas himself remarked30 that the book’s implicit hope that a stateadministered political economy could be totally democratized from within,
conformable to Marx’s own belief in radical democratic socialism, grossly
underestimated the degree to which modern social alienation could be
overcome, ﬁrst with regard to conﬂicting values and interests and second
25
26
27
28
29
30

Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 172.
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 175.
Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 248–250.
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 250.
Jürgen Habermas, “Further Reﬂections on the Public Sphere,” in Habermas and the Public
Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 431–436 and 442–444.
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with regard to a functional split between a technically administered
legal–economic system and a communicatively mediated lifeworld.
To a large extent, Habermas blamed the book’s confusion of normative
idealization and empirical description – which provoked criticism from historians
as well as from feminists and other critics writing on behalf of marginalized
groups and their counter-publics – on the Hegelian Marxist method of ideology
critique it deployed.31 This approach depended on selectively reducing a complex
historical institution to an ideal type, whose underlying values pointed beyond
their partial, contradictory constellation toward a more complete realization.
The idea of a complete democratization of society undervalued not only
efﬁciencies associated with bureaucratic administration and market economy,
but also the difﬁculties of including domestic caregivers (chieﬂy women), overworked employees, and less educated persons as equal participants in what were
supposed to be informed and impartial political discussions.32
Rejecting the Hegelian idealization of the public sphere, Habermas also
rejected his countervailing Marxist tendency to misrepresent the civil society
in which it was anchored as a quasi-economic category. By linking the
structural transformation of the public sphere to the structural transformation of capitalism, Habermas’s account in Structural Transformation displayed
the defects of an economic determinism that undervalued that sphere’s
enduring capacity to function in a critical capacity despite distortions
wrought by the economic–administrative system.
Habermas’s subsequent effort to ground public sphere and civil society on
a non-economic foundation, speciﬁcally with reference to universal normative presuppositions of communicative action, removed the central contradiction that prevented his understanding of the bourgeois public sphere from
being reduced to either utopian wish fantasy or uncritical appendage of the
system. By the late sixties Habermas had begun exploring several Kantian
approaches that sharply distinguished instrumental–economic and
moral–practical domains of action, learning, and social development.33
By the early seventies this line of thought had led him to reconstruct the
universal pragmatic presuppositions underlying everyday speech action
oriented toward facilitating open and transparent cooperation.34 Unlike
31 Habermas, “Further Reﬂections on the Public Sphere,” 435–436.
32 Habermas, “Further Reﬂections on the Public Sphere,” 426–428.
33 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971); and
Jürgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970).
34 Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press,
1979).
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strategic or otherwise manipulative uses of language, communicative action
presupposes mutual agreement between the agent proposing cooperation
and the recipient of the proposal. More precisely, communicative action
presupposes that the recipient understands and accepts, among other things,
the proposer’s understanding of the factual background and rightness of the
proposed interaction, an understanding that the proposer tacitly claims to be
valid (true or right). Most importantly, in claiming this about her action, the
proposer also commits herself to justifying these claims.
Crucially, Habermas reconstructs how speaker and listener must imagine
the way justiﬁcation should unfold as a critical dialogue (“discourse”)
wherein skeptical doubts are overcome and consensus restored by the
“unforced force” of the better argument alone, a force that gains strength
only to the extent that the interlocutors are presumed to have equal opportunities to present the fullest range of reasons without any mental or physical
constraints.35 This counterfactual ideal perfectly captures the moral point of
view – that each person must be accountable to others, so that their reasonable (justiﬁable) dissent is respected. When transferred to the legal sphere, the
discourse principle retains this reference to morality but with an important
twist.36 The basic equal rights to free speech, association, and personal liberty
that it stipulates do not impose a reciprocal moral duty to justify one’s actions
but instead open up a range of permissible action to which the individual
rights holder need be accountable to no one. Such liberal rights, however, are
but empty principles of freedom unless politically qualiﬁed by another
application of the discourse principle, this one involving a procedure of
democratic consent.37
Thus, contrary to the Schmittian analysis of modern liberal democracy
Habermas had once partly endorsed, the discourse-theoretic conception of
democracy logically entails liberal features – basic individual freedoms, equal
protection from discrimination, separation of powers, and the rule of law.
However, elements of Schmitt’s analysis are retained in Habermas’s twotrack model of political deliberation. For example, while discourse in socalled weak publics is largely contestatory and agonal – aimed at interminable
protestation of injustice rather than timely resolution on positive courses of
35 Jürgen Habermas, “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical
Justiﬁcation,” in Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 43–115.
36 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Morality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
37 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 123.
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action – discourse in strong publics oriented to institutional decision-making
terminates in reaching some kind of agreement. Although the legitimation of
law remains conceptually linked to the regulative ideal of attempted rational
consensus on generalizable interests, deliberation that terminates in political
compromise – which Habermas regards as the normal outcome of policy
debates – conforms to this ideal insofar as all parties undertake to modify
their irreducibly competing interests for the sake of achieving a fair and
mutually acceptable balance of power.38

Habermas’s Analysis of the Public Sphere
in Later Writings
Sufﬁce it to say that Habermas’s discourse theory has implications for the
way in which the abstract features of a procedurally just liberal democracy
are concretely interpreted and institutionalized. The constitutional ﬂow of
institutional power – from legislative deliberation and enactment to executive and judicial application – should be entirely responsive to public opinion
undistorted by excessive inﬂuence emanating from government elites and
private interests.39
In a more recent essay on normative democratic theory and empirical
mass media studies, Habermas formulates the supposition that rational
discourse can legitimate democratic decision-making as an assumption
• that relevant issues and controversial answers, requisite information, and
appropriate arguments for and against will be mobilized;
• that the alternatives which emerge will be subjected to examination in
argumentation and will be evaluated accordingly; and
• that rationally motivated ‘yes’ and ‘no’ positions on procedurally correct
decisions will be a deciding factor.40
These three suppositions are satisﬁed differently depending on what arena of
the public sphere they occur within: (1) the formal institutional debates that
occur within the political system; (2) the informal, everyday communications that
occur within civil society; or (3) the passive reception and reﬂective consideration
of abstract information and public opinion that occur in mass media.41 Beginning
with the peripheral sphere of political life that is furthest removed from
political decision-making proper, Habermas identiﬁes civil society, composed
38 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 166. 39 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 193.
40 Jürgen Habermas, Europe: The Faltering Project (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 162.
41 Habermas, Europe, 159.
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of “citizen groups, advocates, churches, and intellectuals,” as well as the
social movements and social networks around which they organize themselves, as responsible for communicating social injustices.42 The political
communication generated through physical encounter and social media
contains a large quantity of non-discursive expressions of social discontent,
involving the use of “story-telling and images, facial and bodily expressions in
general, testimonies, appeals, and the like.”43 The “wild” (spontaneous and
unregulated) nature of political expression within civil society, ranging from
loud plebeian demonstrations of civil disobedience to dispassionate arguments in academic forums, stands in sharp contrast to the highly regulated
arguments that occur within the center of political life, the political system,
which is charged with responding sensitively to the most vocal concerns
circulating in civil society as well as those emanating from lobbyists representing “industry and the labor market, health care, trafﬁc, energy, research
and development, education” and other “functional subsystems.”44 Less
inclusive and free, but procedurally fairer, arguments conducted by government ofﬁcials within institutional settings, Habermas notes, abide by strict
courtroom and parliamentary procedures that are designed to ensure that all
participating parties have an equal voice in debating policies. But these rules
impose rational orderliness by subjecting speakers to severe time limits, legal
constraints, and rules of civil decorum that restrict freedom to argue and
exclude less mainstream points of view. Intermediary between civil society
and the political system is the mass-mediated sphere of communication, which is
charged with condensing, reﬁning, weighing, and selecting public opinions
emanating from civil advocacy groups, special interest lobbyists, and politicians. When properly instituted, with appropriate government regulation
ensuring independent, fully representative, and roughly equal access, this
arena of the public sphere can counteract shortfalls in discursive rationality
that dominate in civil society and government by disseminating opinions
more widely and by subjecting already ﬁltered arguments to a second level of
public reﬂection.
Any possibility of democratic process producing rational, viz., legitimate,
decisions thus depends on the proper institution of the mass media.
Assuming that rational argumentation can have an impact on cooperative
learning and political problem-solving, the question arises whether mass
media can function as well as face-to-face focus-group discussion in generating rational public-opinion formation conducive to reaching consensus.
42 Habermas, Europe, 163.

43 Habermas, Europe, 154.

44 Habermas, Europe, 163.
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Mass Media in the Age of Digital Communication
A new structural transformation of the public sphere driven above all by
digital technological revolutions has accelerated and intensiﬁed the diversity
of information ﬂows. It may seem that the resulting “communicative liquefaction of politics” has made it difﬁcult for any entity to monopolize political
communication.45 Yet Habermas cites several factors that speak against the
prospect that this upsurge in political communication tracks an increase in
rational deliberation.
[T]wo deﬁcits in particular immediately stand out: the lack of straightforward, face-to-face interactions, between really (or virtually) present participants, in a shared practice of collective decision-making; and the lack of
reciprocity between the roles of speakers and addressees in an egalitarian
exchange of opinions and claims. In addition, the dynamics of mass communication betrays relations of power which make a mockery of the presumption of a free play of arguments. The power of the media to select messages
and to shape their presentation is as much an intrinsic feature of mass
communication as the fact that other actors use their power to inﬂuence
the agenda, content, and presentation of public issues is typical of the public
sphere.46

To begin with, mass communication “remains ‘abstract’ insofar as it disregards the actual presence of the more or less passive recipients and
ignores the immediateness of the concrete glances, gestures, thoughts,
and reactions of those who are present and addressed.”47 By not being
“open to the game of direct question and answer, the exchange of afﬁrmation and negation, assertion and contradiction,” mass communication
detaches the propositional content of opinions from the validity-claim
structure of everyday communicative interaction, in which opinions are
linked to a process of argumentative challenge and redemption. In this
respect it is more like a “price regulated network of transactions between
producers and consumers.”48
Second, mass communication possesses an “asymmetrical structure,”
insofar as it reduces addressees to the status of passive spectators and consumers. Journalists and politicians are like actors on a stage vying for the
public’s applause. It is true, of course, that the Internet has provided
a censure-free mechanism for political communication in authoritarian
regimes that has led to remarkable (if short-lived) democratic victories (as
45 Habermas, Europe, 154–155.
48 Habermas, Europe, 156.

46 Habermas, Europe, 154. 47 Habermas, Europe, 156.
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witnessed, for example, in the Arab Spring). But in liberal democracies the
“chat rooms” that seem to have “revived the historically submerged phenomenon of an egalitarian public of reading and writing conversational
partners and correspondents” have largely crystalized around partisan or
otherwise parochial niche audiences, thereby belying the globalizing and
decentering potential of the Internet and, Habermas adds, fragmenting the
public sphere further into entrenched and closed interest groups.49
That said, Habermas insists that these structural deviations from rational
discourse do not necessarily mean that mass media fail to contribute to
rational deliberation . They contribute by ﬁltering inputs from elites within
civil society, government, and functional subsystems in the form of published
opinions, and then reﬂectively generating public opinions (“clusters of controversial issues and inputs to which the parties concerned intuitively attach
weights in accordance with their perceptions of the cumulative ‘yes’ and ‘no’
stances of the wider public” as conveyed by a “representative spectrum of
pooled opinions reﬂected in survey data”).50 Beyond this, mass media also
enable a secondary stage of reﬂection on public opinion, which generates
considered public opinion, by which Habermas understands “a pair of contrary,
more or less coherent opinions, weighted in accordance with agreement and
disagreement, which refer to a relevant issue and express what appears at the
time, in light of available information, to be the most plausible or reasoned
interpretations of a sufﬁciently relevant – though generally controversial –
issue.”51 Considered opinions “ﬁx the parameters for the range of possible
decisions [made by political elites] which the public of voters would accept as
legitimate.” In this way, properly functioning mass media perform two
invaluable tasks in democratic deliberation: They return to civil society its
own messages of discontent, now reﬂectively worked up in the form of
considered public opinion; and they place such opinion before institutional
deliberative bodies, commenting and observing how well such bodies incorporate said opinion into their agendas and debates.52
However, mass media function properly only if the power structures of
the public sphere and the dynamics of mass communication permit it.
The public sphere is inﬂuenced by political power, which shapes the legal
regulations that constitute the diversity and independence of the mass media.
It is inﬂuenced by social power (especially economic power), which must be
exercised in a relatively transparent manner; and it is inﬂuenced by media
49 Habermas, Europe, 158. 50 Habermas, Europe, 165.
52 Habermas, Europe, 162.

51 Habermas, Europe, 166.
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power, which shapes the content and formating of public opinion according to
its own professional code of integrity (fairness and independence). Although
Habermas concedes that sectorial and government elites have a ﬁnancial and
organizational advantage in shaping public opinion according to their preferences relative to the “weak” and “dispersed” publics that form civil society,
he thinks that their strategic interventions can be checked by the reﬂective
counter-responses of well-regulated mass media. Whether this actually happens depends not only on the independence of the media, but also – most
importantly – on the “motivational dispositions and cognitive abilities” of
average citizens. Citizens, Habermas contends, need not possess a large body
of knowledge about politics in order to be knowledgeable in their reasoning
about political choices.53
Habermas expresses considerable skepticism about whether these two
conditions are in fact met. In addressing the problem of independence, he
notes that mass media may be “incompletely differentiated” from their
social and government environments. This was the case with the Italian
government’s postwar monopoly over the broadcasting system, when
each of the three major political parties recruited media personnel from
its own ranks. A potentially more sinister instance occurred when the
United States’ National Security Agency enlisted such telecommunications and Internet giants as Verizon, Telstra, Google, and Facebook in
tracking user data. Lack of independence may also take the form of
a “temporary dedifferentiation,” as when media and government collude
for mutual advantage (favorable news coverage in exchange for access).54
A second pathology manifests itself in citizens’ overly passive and
uncritical consumption of public opinion. Consumption is unequally partitioned among the various sectors of society depending on educational
achievement, social class, and cultural marginalization.55 Apathy, powerlessness, and cynicism, largely in response to the devolution of political
campaigns into image-making spectacles and the debasement of news to
“infotainment” (the blending of news and entertainment in easily consumed soundbites), also reinforce the passive-consumer mentality of
citizens.56
53 Habermas, Europe, 172–173. 54 Habermas, Europe, 174–176.
55 David Ingram and Asaf Bar-Tura, “The Public Sphere as Site of Emancipation and
Enlightenment: A Discourse Theoretic Critique of Digital Communication,” in ReImagining Public Space: The Frankfurt School in the 21st Century, ed. Diana Boros and
James M. Glass (New York: Palgrave, 2014), 65–85.
56 Habermas, Europe, 178–189.
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Counterbalancing this gloomy diagnosis, Habermas cites studies showing
that citizens’ “ascriptive ties between political behavior and social and cultural backgrounds have increasingly loosened.” Such loosening suggests
a growing “independence of political attitudes from determinants such as
place of residence, social class, or religious afﬁliation.” From this Habermas
infers that public reason may be gaining the upper hand over parochial
prejudice when it comes to thinking about particular issues. The new mediagenerated interest in participating in multiple “issue publics” centered on
immediate (short-term), non-economic concerns has “pluralized” participation in distinct but overlapping publics, thereby weakening monolithic partisan loyalties, ideological antagonisms, and narrow group- and identity-based
patterns of political association.57

Alternatives to the Deliberative Model
of the Public Sphere
Habermas’s discourse-theoretic understanding of the public sphere has been
challenged from a variety of fronts too numerous to catalog here. I shall focus
on three of them that have inﬂuenced Habermas’s thinking from the very
beginning: Luhmann’s systems theory, Arendt’s phenomenology of spontaneous grass-roots political activism, and Left-Schmittian realism. Although
traces of these approaches still remain in his mature philosophy, each taken
separately contradicts core tenets of his discourse theory of deliberative
democracy.

The Systems-Theoretic Alternative: Niklas Luhmann
Niklas Luhmann (1927–1998) developed a non-normative theory of society
whose cybernetic and biological modeling of self-contained and self-creative
communication systems is important to us because it represents the exact
antithesis of a society theorized as primarily integrated by personal communication actions regulated by universal egalitarian and consensual norms.
Luhmann’s debate with Habermas in the early seventies and Habermas’s
ongoing efforts to grapple with the implications of Luhmann’s evolving
theory of society for legal and political theory were made all the more
signiﬁcant given that both thinkers drew inspiration from Talcott Parsons
(Luhmann’s former mentor at Harvard) and speciﬁcally incorporated into
their own theories his mature account of differentiated social systems, which
57 Habermas, Europe, 178–189.
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substitute generalized strategic media (such as money, in the case of the
economic system, and power in the case of the legal system) for consensual
communication in integrating (or coordinating) social behavior.58
In Habermas’s socal theory, consensual communication normatively anchors
the system. By contrast, Luhmann’s theory of society (Gesellschaftstheorie) makes
the continuation of systems-mediated communication the anchor for normative
integration. Indeed, his theory demotes individual social agents to relatively
insigniﬁcant systems of personal meaning (“consciousness”) in comparison with
the interactive communicative systems which connect them (Luhmann’s dismissal of the theory of consciousness as an ontological starting point is one of
the very few points on which he and Habermas agree). ‘Communication’ here is
described in the non-normative language of cybernetics: Systems – be they
persons, organizations, or functional orders – observe each other as environments whose complex effects they process into information (reduce to ‘meaning’) for purposes of selection, pursuant to the re-establishment of successful
adaptation and internal stability. The successful functional adaptation of
a system’s social structure to its outer environment along with the subsequent
restabilization of its inner identity reinforces a conservative tendency toward
maintaining continuity.
Luhmann’s theory of society is more than just a theory of social systems.59
Like Parsons’s (and Habermas’s) social theory, it also contains a theory of
social evolution and a theory of functional social differentiation.60 Over time
pre-modern societies develop organizational systems that culminate in an
administrative state as supreme coordinator of otherwise chaotic networks of
communicative interaction; but, pressured by problems of growth, the uniﬁed, hierarchical community (Gemeinschaft) such stratiﬁed state-centered
societies normatively integrate will evolve into a functionally differentiated,
decentralized, non-normatively integrated communication network coupling distinct economic, legal, political, familial, educational, and religious
subsystems. These functional systems are “autopoietic,” or self-contained in
their internal generation of meaning; each processes what it has observed
from its environment into information using its own unique binary code for
selecting inputs. For example, events in the legal system are coded in terms of
58 Jürgen Habermas (with Niklas Luhmann), Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie –
Was leistet die Systemforschung? (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971); Niklas Luhmann,
A Sociological Theory of Law, ed. Martin Albrow, trans. Elizabeth King-Utz and Martin
Albrow (London: Routledge, 1985); and Habermas, Between Facts and Norms.
59 Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society, trans. Rhodes Barrett, 2 vols. (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2012–2013).
60 See Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two.
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whether they are lawful or unlawful, whereas events in the political system
are coded in terms of whether they are legitimate or illegitimate; that is to
say, whether or not they successfully motivate public compliance with
government decision-making.
Here we see how the background interaction systems that populate the
public sphere and generate public opinion play a potentially ambivalent – and
by no means critical – role in Luhmann’s analysis of the political system.61
The political system in the modern welfare state understands itself (paradoxically) as a universal decision procedure for solving problems that arise
from within other functional subsystems. But in reality its power to steer
these other systems is limited because it communicates with them in its own
language, the ‘effects’ of which are processed very differently by these other
systems in terms of their languages. The possibility of synchronized structural coupling linking different functional systems is thus utterly contingent,
leading Luhmann himself to doubt whether inter-systemic integration (e.g.,
revolutionary political change of the constitutional legal order) is possible
(Steuerungsskeptizismus). To take an iconic example drawn from the public
sphere, a judge cannot but regard a peaceful act of civil disobedience as
a form of law-breaking that should be suppressed. For a state that needs law
to resolve its own paradox of self-authorizing power, maintenance of constitutional procedure would seem to demand the same course of action.
However, from the perspective of the democratic political system which
motivates compliance with state authority, elected ofﬁcials cannot but regard
this same event as one – potentially necessary – reﬂection on (or observation
of) the political system’s current state of instability. Because the state organizational system must communicate with both legal and political subsystems in order to function successfully, it must unhappily choose between two
horns of a dilemma, both of which are guaranteed to produce systemic crisis:
tolerate law breaking or suppress politics.
In sum, Luhmann’s reduction of the public sphere to a network of
cybernetically conceived interactive subsystems that are subsumed under
more hegemonic functional systems renders, by his own admission, democracy, representation, and sovereignty inherently paradoxical as meaningful
political categories. Equally paradoxical, on his account, is the successful
functioning of public opinion as a critical check on organizational and functional political power. Indeed, the political, understood as a distinctive
61 Niklas Luhmann, Political Theory in the Welfare State (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990); and
Niklas Luhmann, Die Politik der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2000).
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category of communicative action, appears to have been all but effaced by the
technical, understood as a general feature of social administration.

The Neo-anarchist Alternative: Hannah Arendt
Diametrically opposed to techno-scientiﬁc descriptions proffered by systems
theory are those neo-anarchist interpretations of the public sphere that
descend from Hannah Arendt (1906–1975), an existential phenomenologist
who, as we saw above, has inﬂuenced Habermas’s thought from the very
beginning. As a former student of Heidegger, Arendt was concerned about
rescuing an archaic mode of existence from the oblivion of modern technology. In keeping with the communication-centered Existenzphilosophie elaborated by her dissertation supervisor, Karl Jaspers, the mode of existence she
sought to recover was not poetic thinking about being as such but political
action as a distinctive form of manifesting a world of meaning and individual
identity that ﬁrst – and Arendt seems to suggest, most authentically –
appeared in the ancient Greek polis.62
Like Habermas, Arendt closely ties political action to the legitimation of
power, with some of her accounts of political action resonating with the
social-contractarian language favored by Habermas. In discussing the spontaneous act of constituting a shared political space through mutual promising, Arendt seems to postulate voluntary consent as a universal norm of
legitimation.63 Her contrast between the ‘communicative power’ (Macht) of
public opinion and the ‘violence’ (Gewalt) of coercive legal imposition is later
taken up by Habermas in explaining how legitimate exercises of the latter
depend upon the former.64 Again, in her discussion of Kant’s political understanding of judgment (1982), she draws attention to the importance of
communication in generating an “enlarged thought” that takes into account
the opinions of others.65
But some of Arendt’s other descriptions of political action deviate so
markedly from Habermas’s as to constitute a counter-theory to his own.
For Arendt, the essence of political action is essentially non-instrumental, not
the achievement of this or that end but the public revelation of each actor’s
62 Arendt, The Human Condition.
63 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking, 1973), 173 and 192–268; and
David Ingram, “Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Trial of (Post)Modernity or the Tale of
Two Revolutions,” in Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years Later, ed. Larry May and
Jerome Kohn (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 221–250.
64 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 196.
65 Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, ed. and trans. Ronald Beiner
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982).
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individuality in an agonal exchange of opinions. In keeping with this dramaturgic notion of political action, Arendt introduces the public space as the
cultural arena where public spectators memorialize the ﬂeeting deeds and
words of political actors by judging them and, in so doing, narrate their own
shared political identity. All of this, Habermas observes, suggests an aesthetic – rather than cognitive–practical – understanding of the public.66

The Realist Left-Schmittian Alternative: Chantal Mouffe
Given Habermas’s hostility to Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) and his political
theology, it may seem strange to claim him as anything more than
a passing inﬂuence on Habermas’s early theorizing of the structural transformation of the public sphere. Stranger still is the very idea that an unrepentant
Nazi jurist could ﬁnd a receptive home in any contemporary left-wing
political theory, until we recall the antipathy toward liberalism that many
on the left (including his former students Otto Kirchheimer and Franz
Neumann, who later afﬁliated with the Frankfurt School) shared with
Schmitt. More recent left-wing revivals of Schmitt’s thought have appropriated his incisive observations regarding the impotence of law in relation to
its decisive application by executive authority, the theological genealogy of
political categories such as sovereignty, the opportunistic manipulation of
humanitarian law as subterfuge for imperial aggression, and the need to
deﬁne politics in terms of implacable partisan opposition rather than
compromise.
No other contemporary theorist has done more to revive Schmitt’s reputation in this regard than Chantal Mouffe, who, joining with many leftists in
the eighties and nineties, felt betrayed by the willingness of socialist parties to
compromise their militant platforms for the sake of collaborating with big
business in pursuing liberal and neoliberal administrative policies. Like
Schmitt, Mouffe objects to liberalism because it privileges individuals as the
central actors in political life, which liberalism incoherently conceives as
a domain dominated by the pursuit of both rational self-interest and universal
morality. More precisely, liberalism overlooks individuals’ passionate identiﬁcation with identity groups such as labor unions, whose very identities are
necessarily shaped in an agonal struggle for hegemony in opposition to other
identity groups, such as business associations.67 The reference to hegemony
66 Jürgen Habermas and Thomas McCarthy, “Hannah Arendt’s Communications
Concept of Power,” Social Research, 44(1) (1977), 3–24.
67 Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically (London: Verso, 2013), 4–5
and 137.
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underscores Mouffe’s disagreement with Arendt and her debt to Gramsci, for
whom the acquisition of power serves as the principal aim of politics.68
Mouffe parses the theoretical implications of hegemonic power by referencing Schmitt’s equation of democracy and unrestricted majoritarian dictatorship. For Schmitt the general will inscribed in democratic rule cannot be
universal; it cannot reﬂect the common interests of humanity, as liberalism
claims. An abstract norm such as human rights lacks sufﬁcient concreteness
to be the basis for a ruling will. Indeed, this and every other general norm
lacks prescriptive force until its precise meaning has been decided. But
decision, as an act of will, must be particular and exclusive. If we say, as
Schmitt does, that the speciﬁc meaning of a general law ultimately depends
on the sole discretion of the supreme executive power enforcing it, then we
go no further than asserting a Hobbesian identiﬁcation of legal order with
absolute sovereign authority. However, if we insist that sovereign power
must be authorized democratically, then we assert something more, namely,
that an adversarial struggle must identify the holder of that power as
a majority that possesses an exclusive right to decide for a minority.69
The exclusive exercise of sovereign political power dictates the adversarial
nature of democratic politics. Although Mouffe disagrees with Schmitt’s
characterization of democratic politics as an antagonistic war uniting friends
against foes, she agrees that any such politics will involve partisan groups that
view each other as adversaries.70 Adversaries respect the legitimacy of each
party’s right to advance its political agenda. To that extent they can be said to
agree on an abstract constitutional framework of equal rights and toleration.
But this consensus is grounded not in common reason, but in overlapping
comprehensive belief systems (as Rawls puts it) that are irreducibly particular, if not incommensurable. Because these comprehensive belief systems are
embedded in emotionally imbued group identities that are maintained only
in opposition to other such identities, this consensus will itself take the form
of contestation and struggle (what Mouffe calls conﬂictual consensus and
what Rawls would call a modus vivendi). Indeed, the very constitutional
framework constraining this struggle will also be a site of political
contestation.71
The fault lines separating Mouffe and Habermas are not as clearly demarcated as those separating Schmitt and Habermas, but they are sharp nonetheless. Both Habermas and Mouffe identify the public space of democratic
68 Mouffe, Agonistics, 9–11 and 73–75. 69 Mouffe, Agonistics, 5–6.
70 Mouffe, Agonistics, 7 and 137–139. 71 Mouffe, Agonistics, 8–9.
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political life with a plurality of voices that are free to criticize and contest. But
their understanding of the mutual respect that constrains political opponents
is different. For Habermas respect for someone implies a willingness to offer
her reasons that she could in principle accept. If we now follow Mouffe in
discarding the rational premises underlying Habermas’s notion of consent,
then respect for the other resides in acknowledging that the adversary is like
oneself in her passionate attachment to an emotionally compelling political
worldview and, as such, should be given the freedom to contest, if not the
freedom to share in political rule. But this weak legitimation of democratic
order – that all are free to contest – is qualiﬁed by the fact that the composition of the ‘all’ is itself a political issue that those in power must decide.
Should all groups – no matter how threatening to the hegemonic order (as
seen by those in power) be free to contest as respected adversaries? Where do
we (the dominant majority) draw the line between ‘enemies of the state’ and
adversaries whose worldviews strike us as deeply corrosive of society? For
Mouffe, there is no way to decide this question rationally.
Habermas and Mouffe both view the public sphere as ﬁtting into
a circulation of power that culminates in a decision to exercise legal coercion,
and in this respect their understanding of the political differs from Arendt’s.
But Habermas sees the primary function of politics as deliberation centered
around collaborative and rational problem-solving, whereas Mouffe sees it as
a non-rational, agonistic struggle oriented toward achieving hegemonic
power for one’s group. In essence, they depart from conﬂicting phenomenologies of political experience that have distinctive afﬁnities with social class.
Habermas does not deny the emotional identiﬁcation underlying group
loyalty, but he can point to empirical evidence showing that more educated
citizens who are guided by enlightened self-interest identify less strongly with
ideological groups and show more independence in their political preferences
than do their less educated counterparts.

Globalizing the Public Sphere
Since the late nineties globalization has overwhelmed the state’s capacity to
manage its borders, defend against internal and external security risks,
regulate its economy, and guarantee public services. Meanwhile, the parallel
expansion of transnational systems of governance has increasingly limited
what states can do to advance their subjects’ well-being.
If society must be conceived as world society, as Luhmann argues, then we
would naturally expect to ﬁnd it structured by various functional systems,
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including a global political system, that would supersede and connect its
state-centered segments. Luhmann’s surprising silence on this possibility –
and his neglect of international relations in general – is only now drawing
a response from systems theorists, such as Günther Teubner (1944–), who,
using Luhmann’s model of autopoietic systems, has argued that globalization
has effectively detached constitutional law from public law and from the
nation state.72 International law has increasingly migrated from the domain
of public law (dealing with humanitarian crimes, for example) to the plural
domains of private law. International law has become fragmented into
heterogeneous, autopoietic (self-constituting), transnational legal subsystems
(of copyright, trade, and so on) that compete with international public law.
Neoliberal trade regulations effectively prohibit states from performing
welfare functions that institutionalize human rights. Accordingly, social
movements have now switched from criticizing states to protesting against
non-state organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
the various systems of private law within which it operates. But as the targets
of protest constantly shift and fragment, so do the protesting publics.
The self-referential paradoxes of self-creating systems diagnosed by
Luhmann at the level of the welfare state become more intense globally, as
legal and political systems become increasingly decoupled and fragmented.
Habermas and other critical theorists express ambivalence regarding this
development, at once bemoaning the decline of local democratic control
while remaining guardedly hopeful that global democratic control can reassert itself against legal and political fragmentation and steer supranational
government toward more effective and fair cosmopolitan humanitarian
policies aimed at mitigating civil conﬂict, human rights violations, poverty,
inequality, and climate change. Here they look to an emerging global public
sphere, anchored largely by NGOs, popular social movements, and similar
“players” within a global civil society. The public opinion generated by these
voices is leveraged against outlaw states and other human rights violators as
well as democratically unaccountable global economic multilaterals, such as
the WTO and the World Bank, whose trade and lending policies are widely
believed to beneﬁt richer nations (and richer individuals) to the detriment of
the poor.73
72 Günther Teubner and Peter Korth, “Two Kinds of Legal Pluralism: Collision of
Transnational Regimes in the Double Fragmentation of World Society,” in Regime
Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation, ed. Margaret A. Young
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 23–54.
73 Habermas, Europe, 125.
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Contemporary political theorists in the European tradition by no means
agree on whether this emerging site of global public opinion constitutes
a global public sphere. If we depart from critical theory’s standard understanding of the public sphere as essentially connected to the legitimation of
political power as distinct from occasional protestation of its exercise, then
any talk of a global public sphere would seem to presuppose the existence of
a relatively uniﬁed global opinion capable of inﬂuencing the deliberation and
decision-making of international agencies possessing global legislative
powers. It is far from clear whether such agencies currently exist (or even
could exist) and what form they might possibly take in the future. What is
clear is that without them it would make no sense to talk about a global
public sphere functioning in a way analogous to a domestic public sphere.
Furthermore, the existence of such international legislative bodies tells us
little about the possibility of a global public opinion that might direct their
deliberation and decision-making. Absent global legislative agencies that are
susceptible to democratic structuration and a global civil society capable of
generating global opinions inﬂuencing their deliberation and decisionmaking, one might at best speak of a global public sphere whose functioning
would be very different from the domestic model.
The possibility of a global public sphere analogous in functioning to
a domestic public sphere depends on the coherence of democratic global
governance. No critical theorist believes that such a system of global governance currently exists, but Habermas and other theorists such as Brunkhorst
and Benhabib, who interpret the post-World War II development of
humanitarian law as a process of constitutionalization, see it as an emerging
fact, centered on a reformed UN.74 Such a government would not replace
nation states, which would still be responsible for enforcing and interpreting
international and cosmopolitan law. But its laws and regulations, to the
degree that they were coercively enforced, would require democratic legitimation. International legislation could be legitimated through national and
regional public spheres as is now the case, but cosmopolitan legislation affecting human rights and other forms of humanitarianism would likely be carried
out by a constitutionally re-founded General Assembly whose legitimate
functioning would depend on public opinion generated by a global public
sphere.
74 Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism: Hospitality, Sovereignty and Democratic
Iterations, ed. Robert Post (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); and
Hauke Brunkhorst, Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions: Evolutionary Perspectives
(London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
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Many critical theorists have questioned the legitimacy of the current state
system that anchors international law. If discourse ethics demands that all
who are affected by governance have some say in shaping it, then no
municipal policy possessing global impact can rely on national public opinion
alone for its legitimation. The determination of whose voice should count in
shaping national immigration, energy, and trade policy cannot be determined
by simple appeal to a nationally bounded public sphere. The determination of
this matter would instead lie with some supranational (but not necessarily
global) public.75
If international treaty law cannot rely on the bounded publics of its
constituent parties for democratic legitimation without begging the metapolitical question regarding the legitimacy of those very publics, then its true
scope will have to be reconceived as transnational, if not cosmopolitan. Some
critical theorists challenge the idea of such a transnational (or cosmopolitan)
public sphere.76 The scope and diversity of such a public would likely undermine any possibility of generating a relatively uniﬁed global opinion capable
of guiding global legislators. However, in the absence of a centralized,
hierarchically structured global government – whose monopoly over the
creation and interpretation of cosmopolitan law many critical theorists fear –
the need for such a global sphere analogous to the domestic type seems
rather superﬂuous. If we then continue to speak of a global public sphere, it
would be in terms of a structurally transformed public sphere. The kind of
global public sphere appropriate to a decentered system of global governance
linking overlapping demoi would be neither strong nor weak but distributive,
enhancing deliberation across demoi. Whether this decentered model of
global governance, with its modest conditions for democratic legitimation,
can compel hegemonic superpowers to effectively and fairly address our
current humanitarian crises remains to be seen.

75 Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
76 James Bohman, “Democracy, Solidarity and Global Exclusion,” Philosophy and Social
Criticism, 32(7) (2006), 809–817.
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